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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a declaratory judgment action for judicial deten11ination of the respective
interests of the parties in the proceeds from the sale of dairy cows.

Fan11ers National Bank

asserts that its perfected security interest created pursuant to Idaho Code §28-9-101, et seq.,
constitutes a first priority lien on dairy cows and the proceeds from the sale of those dairy cows.
Hull Fam1s, Inc.; Ernest Daniel Carter dba Carter Hay and Livestock ("Dan Carter"); Lewis
Becker; Jack McCall; and Tim Thornton (the "Agricultural Commodity Dealers"), assert that
their agricultural commodity liens on agricultural products created pursuant to Idaho Code §451801, et. seq., extend from the products to the dairy cows that consumed the products and the
proceeds from the sale of those dairy cows and have priority over Fan11ers National Bank"s
perfected security interest. Fanners National Bank asserts that Idaho Code §45-1801, et seq.
does not provide for the extension of agricultural commodity liens on agricultural products to
livestock which consume those products or the proceeds from the sale of the livestock.
The dairy cows were owned by Green River Dairy, LLC, and Herculano J. Alves
and Frances M. Alves, husband and wife, dba Green River Dairy ("Green River Dairy").
However, the amount claimed by Farmers National Bank and the total amount claimed by the
five Ag1icultural Commodity Dealers exceeds the amount received as proceeds from the sale of
the dairy cows, such that the owners of the dairy cows have no claim to the proceeds.
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COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Farn1ers National Bank filed a Complaint for Declaratory .Tudf:,iment (R. Vol. L pp.
17-34) seeking a judicial determination that its security interest by UCC-1 F financing statements
filed pursuant to Idaho Code §28-9-101, ct. seq., constituted a first priority lien on the dairy cows
and the proceeds from the sale of the dairy cows.
Hull Farms, Inc., filed an Answer (R. Vol. I, pp. 35-41) asserting that it had
priority to the proceeds pursuant to Idaho Code Section 45-1801, ct. seq., and its filing of a Forn1
C-1 Af,rricultural Products lien.
Tim Thornton filed an Answer (R. Vol. I, pp. 42-46) asserting that he had priority
to the proceeds pursuant to Idaho Code Section 45-1801, et. seq., and his filing ofa Fonn C-1
Af:,YTicultural Products lien.
Lewis Becker filed an Answer, Counterclaim and Cross-Claim (R. Vol. I, pp. 4758)

that he had priority to the proceeds pursuant to Idaho Code Section 45-1801, et.
and his filing of a Fom1 C-1 Agricultural Products lien and seeking a money judgment and

lien foreclosure against Green River Dairy.
Green River Dairy filed an Answer (R. Vol. I, pp. 59-61) generally denying that
Farmers National Bank was entitled to relief.
Jack McCall filed an Answer, Counterclaim, and Cross-Claims (R. Vol. L pp.
75) asserting that he had priority to the proceeds pursuant to Idaho Code §45-180 l, et. seq., and
his filing of a Fom1
foreclosure against Green
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Agricultural Products lien and seeking a money judgment and lien
Dairy.

Dan Carter filed an Answer, Counterclaim, and Cross-Claims (R. Vol. I, pp. 7697) asserting that he had priority to the proceeds pursuant to Idaho Code §45-1801, et. seq .. and
his filing of a Form C-1 Agricultural Products lien and seeking a money judgment and lien
foreclosure against Green River Dairy.
fanners National Bank filed a Reply to Counterclaim of Jack McCall (R. Vol, I,
pp. 98-101), a Reply to Counterclaim of Lewis Becker (R. Vol. I, pp. 102-105), and a Reply to
Counterclaim of Dan Carter (R. Vol. I, pp. 106-109) denying the entitlement to relief and
reasserting its priority claims.
Green River Dairy did not respond to the Cross Claims of Lewis Becker, Jack
McCa11 or Dan Catier.
Fanners National Bank filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (R. Vol. I, pp. 110113) suppmied by affidavits and briefing. All other parties with the exception of Green River
Dairy filed responsive affidavits and briefing.

Lewis Becker filed a Motion for Summary

Jud,gment (R. Vol. III, pp. 426-429) as did Jack McCa11 and Dan Catier (R. Vol. III, pp. 477481). Oral argument was held on April 9, 2012. On May 8, 2012, Judge Bevan entered his
Memorandum Decision Re: Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (Augmentation Record
pp. 1-13) denying relief to Farmers National Bank and granting summary judgment in favor of
Hull f anns, Inc.; Tim Thornton; Lewis Becker; Jack McCall and Dan Cmier.
Subsequently, a Judgment (R. Vol. III, pp. 564-569) was entered on May 30,
2012, and an Amended Judgment (R. Vol. III, pp. 580-584) was entered on August 29, 2012.
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Farmers National Bank filed an Amended Notice of Appeal (R. Vol. flI, pp. 585-589) to that
Amended Judgment.

OF THE FACTS
Farmers 1\lational Bank
of Scott Tverdy (R. Vol. I, pp. J 30-1

that the following facts set forth in the Affidavit
) and the Affidavit of John S. Ritchie (R. Vol. I, p. 142-

Vol. II, p. 386) are undisputed. Beginning April 25, 2008, Farmers National Bank made ten
loans to Green River Dairy,

all of which loans were guaranteed by Herculano J. Alves and

Frances M. Alves, husband and wife, and The Mary Rose Haagsma Revocable Living Trust, the
members of the LLC (R. Vol. I, p. 132). All of the loan and security documents are attached as
Exhibits to the Complaint attached as Exhibit "4'' to the Affidavit of John S. Ritchie (R. Vol. I, p.
157-Vol. II, p. 386).
That prior to the fonnation of Green River Dairy, LLC, on Apri1 8, 2008, Farmers
National Bank had made numerous loans to Hercu1ano J. Alves and Frances M. Alves, husband
and wife, dba Green River Dairy, which loans were secured by security agreements and a UCClF

covering cattle (R. Vol. I, p. 133). That as additional security for the loans made to

Green River Dairy, LLC, Herculano J.

and Frances M. Alves, personally guaranteed the

loans and granted Famers National Bank a security interest in all cattle owned by them and the
UCC-1 F previously filed remained ofrccord with the Idaho Secretary of State (R. Vol. I, p. 133).
That the security documents for the ten loans made to Green River Dairy, LLC,
included the following:
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a. State of Idaho - Farm Products Financing Statement - Form UCC-1 F
filed with the Idaho Secretary of State on July 14, 2006, Filing
Number F75997, and continued on May 27, 2011, Filing Number
F47056:
Debtor(s): Hcrculano Alves, Frances Alves and Green River Dairy
Secured Party: Fanners National Bank
Products: Triticale, oats, field com, hay, ensilage, dairy cattle and
milk.
b. State of Idaho - Fann Products Financing Statement - Form UCC-1 F
filed with the Idaho Secretary of State on May 12, 2008, Filing
Number F78573:
Debtor(s): Green River Dairy LLC
Secured Party: Farmers National Bank
Products: Rye (including triticale), oats, field com, hay, ensilage,
dairy cattle and milk.
(R. Vol. I, p. 133; Vol. L pp. 32-34).
That subsequent thereto the five Agiicultural Commodity Dealers delivered
agricultural products to Green River Dairy, all of which agricultural products were fed to cattle
owned by Green River Dairy. Those pmiies filed agricultural commodity dealer liens on the
products delivered.

The respective liens claimed by each of those parties are itemized in

Appendix A of this Brief. The total of all filed C-1 lien claims is $185,404.71.
Green River Dairy defaulted on its obligations to Fanners National Bank and
Farmers National Bank took possession of the dairy cattle that were co11ateral for the ten loans
(R. Vol. I, p. 134). The Complaint recites that Fam1ers National Bank disposed of some of the
cattle at auction sale at Producers Livestock Marketing Association in Jerome, Idaho.

The

proceeds from the sale totaled $211,957 .58 and Producers Livestock issued two checks made
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payable to Green River Dairy c/o Herculano J. Alves and Farmers National Bank and Hull
Fanns, Inc., and Jack McCall and Dan Carter (R. Vol. I, p. 134).
After the filing of the Complaint, the remainder of the cattle were sold. I1 was
stipulated to by Farmers National Bank at oral argument that the disposition of all of the
proceeds received by Fanners National Bank from the sale of cattle with the Green River Dairy
brand would be governed by the Court's decision on the motions for summary judgment (Tr. pp.
8-10).
The amount due and owing to Farmers National Bank from Green River Dairy,
LLC, which debt was guaranteed by Herculano J. Alves and Frances M. Alves, husband and
wife, was $2,616,008.24 as of February 1, 2012 (R. Vol. I, p. 134).

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Did Judge Bevan err in interpreting Idaho Code §45-1802 as providing

that an agricultural commodity dealer lien on an agricultural product extends to livestock which
consume the product and the proceeds of sale of the livestock.
2.

Did Judge Bevan err in detem1ining that the five Agricultural Commodity

Dealers have liens on the proceeds of sale of livestock, which are prior to the perfected security
interest of Fanners National Bank in those proceeds.
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ATTORNEYS FEES OJ\ APPEAL
National Bank claims attorneys foes on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code
§§10-1210 and

1809.

ARGUMENT

A.
Introduction
The central issue on appeal in this case is one of statutory interpretation.
the Idaho Legislature enacted a new law which provided for the creation of a lien in favor of
producers and dealers in agricultural products. The law was codified as Chapter 18 of Title 45 of
the Idaho Code. The liens provided for are designated in the title of Chapter 18 as "Agricultural
commodity dealer liens." The kind of lien provided for and the class of persons v.•ho may have
the lien are generally set forth in Idaho Code

1802 which presently and at all times pertinent

to this case reads as follows:

45-1802. Lien created-Who may have.- An agricultural commodity producer or
an agricultural commodity dealer who sells, or delivers under contract or
bailment, an agricultural product has a lien on the agricultural product or the
proceeds of the sale of the agricultural product as provided in section 45-1804,
Idaho Code. The lien created in this chapter may attach regardless of whether the
purchaser uses the agricultural product purchased to increase the value of his
livestock or whether he uses the agricultural product purchased to maintain the
value, health or status of his livestock without actually increasing the value of his
agricultural product.
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The second sentence of this section was added to the first by an amendment to the
statute in l 989. This case concerns how the second sentence of this sectlon of the statute should
be interpreted. Specifically, the issue is whether by the addition of the second sentence the Idaho
Legislature changed the statute to provide that the lien could attach not only to agricultural
products and the proceeds of sale of those products, as stated in the first sentence, but also to
livestock which consumed those products. The District Court ruled that the second sentence
unambiguously extends the lien to livestock. It is the contention of Fa1mers National Bank that
it is a mistake to interpret the second sentence this way, that the 1989 amendment to the statute
did not extend the scope of the lien beyond agricultural products and the proceeds of sale of such
products, and, therefore, that the liens of the Agricultural Commodity Dealers did not extend to
the livestock or proceeds of sale of the livestock which consumed the agricultural products to
which their liens had attached.
B.

Standard of Review
The standard of review for appeal from an order of summary judgment has been
recently summarized by the Idaho Supreme Court as follows:
This Court reviews appeals from an order of summary judgment de nova, and the
"standard of review is the same as the standard used by the trial court in ruling on
a motion for summary judgment." Curlee v. Kootenai County Fire & Rescue, 148
ldaho 391, 394, 224 P.3d 458, 461 (2008) (citations omitted). Thus summary
jud,gment is appropriate if "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law." I.R.C.P. 56(c). Under this standard, "disputed facts are construed in favor
of the non-moving party, and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the
record are drawn in favor of the non-moving party." Curlee, 148 Idaho at 394,
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224 P .3d at 461. \\7here "the evidence reveals no disputed issues of material fact,
then only a question oflaw remains, over which this Court exercises free review."
Lockheed 1\1artin C01p. v. Idaho State
Comm 'n, 142 Idaho 790, 793, 1 P.3d
641, 644 (2006). This Court exercises "free revie\v over interpreting a statute's
meaning and applying the facts to the law."
VC v. Dakota Co., 141 Idaho
1, 109 P.3d 714, 719 (2005).

Stonebrook Construction, LLC v. Chase Home Finance,
376(2012).

Idaho 927, 929, 277 P.3d 374,

c.
The District Court Erred in Applying the Applicable Rules of Statutory Interpretation
Statutory interpretation begins with the wording of the statute and the threshold
issue m statutory interpretation is whether the statute under review is ambiguous or
unambiguous:
Interpretation of a statute begins with an examination of the statute's literal words.
Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous courts give effect to the
statute as written, without
in statutory construction. Only where the
language is ambiguous will this Court look to rules of construction for guidance
and consider the reasonableness of proposed interpretations.

Stonebrook Construction, LLC v. Chase Home
374, 378 (2012) (citing Curlee v. Kootenai County Fire &

152 Idaho 927, 931, 277 P.3d
148 Idaho 391, 398, 224 P.3d

458, 465 (2008) with internal citations omitted).

In its Memorandum Decision Re: Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment
(Augmentation Record pp. 1-13), the District Comi concluded Idaho Code

1802 to be

unambiguous and that this section unambiguously means that. in addition to agricultural products
and proceeds of sale of those products, agricultural commodity liens may attach to animals
which consume those products. However, the District Court's interpretation of the meaning of

APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 9

the statute rests upon considerations and rules of construction which only should come into play
where the statute in question has been first judged to be ambiguous.

Therefore, the District

Court's analysis in support of its conclusion is fundamentally flawed, leads to an unsupportable
interpretation of the statute and should be disregarded.
Relying upon State v. Yzaguirre, 144 Idaho 471, 476; 163 P.3d 1183, 1188
(2007), the District Court states " [a statute's] ambiguity is contingent upon whether a number of
reasonable interpretations can be made regarding its meaning." (Augmentation Record p. 7). In
Yzaguirre the Court was confronted with two litigants each of whom asserted that the statute
under review was unambiguous, but who each advocated a different interpretation of what the
statute meant. The Court concluded that only one of these interpretations was reasonable and
that, therefore, the statute was unambiguous.

(Augmentation Record p. 7).

In this general

respect the District Court's analysis in this case minor's the Supreme Court's analysis m
Yzaguirre. But a closer reading of Yzaguirre reveals a crucial difference.
In Yzaguirre the conflicting interpretations had to do with how the grammar of
the statute was to be construed. It had nothing to do with which interpretation was "reasonable"
from the standpoint of sensible or sound legislation. The parties and the Supreme Court's focus
was on determining the plain meaning of the words of the statute. The interpretations of the
parties diverged on the question of the import of the placement of a comma in the text of the
statute.

The Court concluded as a matter of ordinary grammar that only one of the two

interpretations advocated was reasonable.
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In the case before the Court today, hovvever, the District Court's analysis does not
focus on what is reasonable or not so far as discerning the plain meaning of the words of the
statute. The District Court looks to which of two proposed interpretations results in a law which,
in the Court's view, is reasonable and not absurd in its application. But the reasonableness or
absurdity of a law is not a valid consideration when interpreting an unambiguous statute, or
deciding whether a statute is ambiguous in the first place. In Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Regional

Medical Center, 151 Idaho 889, 896, 265 P.3d 502, 509 (2011) the Idaho Supreme Court
declined to address the plaintiff's argument that a statute could not be construed as it was plainly
written if the statute, so construed, was patently absurd, noting:
Thus, we have never revised or voided an unambiguous statute on the ground that
it is patently absurd or would produce absurd results when construed as written,
and we do not have the authority to do so.

!bid. at p. 896. Likewise, the fact that the plain meaning of a statute implies harsh results in the
statute's application does not allow a court to construe an unambiguous statute to mean
something different from what the legislature has said:
However, the "public policy of legislative enactments cannot be questioned by the
courts and avoided simply because the comis might not agTee with the public
policy so announced." State v. Village o.fGarden City, 74 Idaho 513, 525, 265 P.
2d 328, 334 ( 1953). Therefore, this Court's duty is "to interpret the meaning of
legislative enactments without regard to possible results." Id.
... Although the result for Stonebrook is harsh, it is the result the Legislature
intended. We are not at liberty to disregard this legislative detcnnination as to the
most effective means of protecting the public.
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Stonebrook Construction, LLC at pp. 932-933. Therefore, even if the plain meaning of a statute
is perceived to produce absurd or harsh results, that does not allow reaching beyond its plain
meaning to construe the statute to mean something different from what the words of the statute
plainly say.

D.
The District Court erred in concluding that an amendment to a statute must always change
preexisting law

The District Court first found the interpretation of Idaho Code §45-802 advocated
by Fanner's National Bank to be unreasonable on the basis that if the second sentence does not
expand the scope of the lien beyond agricultural products to livestock which consume those
products, then the second sentence adds nothing to what the first sentence says and is, therefore,
superfluous.

Citing the rule of construction that "a court should not interpret a statute in a way

that would render it superfluous" the Court found Farmers National Bank's interpretation
unreasonable.

(Augmentation Record p. 8).

However, this rule of construction is properly

employed only after the meaning of a statute has been detennined to be ambiguous. Because the
second sentence of Idaho Code §45-1802 was added as an amendment to a preexisting statute,
the more applicable rule of construction is the presumption that an amendment to a statute
indicates an intent to change the statue's meaning. Gonzalez. v. Thacker, 148 Idaho 879, 883,
231 P. 3d 524, 528 (2009).

However, "[T]he presumption does not apply where statute's

meaning is not in doubt." Am Jur 2d, Statutes §63. Moreover, an amendment to a statute may
simply clarify or strengthen a statute without altering or changing it.
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Pearl v. Board of

Professional Discipline of Idaho State Board of Medicine, 137 Idaho 107, 114, 44 P. 3d I 162,

1169 (2002); Stonecipher v. Stonecipher. 131 Idaho 731, 735, 963 P. 2d 1168, 1172 (1998 ).
Jn Stonecipher, the amendment in question simply added one sentence to Idaho
Code §5-245. The Court noted that the added sentence did not change the statute from what it
was before the amendment:
No alteration was made to the statute as it previously existed. The amended
version simply clarified the language of the original statute by providing a list,
though non-exhaustive, of terms to be encompassed by "an action or proceeding
to eolleet child support arrearages."
!bid at p. 735. Therefore, if the second sentence of Idaho Code §45-1802 is unambiguous as it

stands, then there is no basis for applying rules of eonstruetion to make the second sentence
mean something other than what it plainly says, even though when plainly read the second
sentence does not alter or change preexisting law.
E.
The District Court also erred reasoning that un]ess the second sentence extends the scope of
the things to which the lien may attach, it is self-contradictory and meaningless.

The District Court also concluded that if the second sentence does not extend the
scope of the lien to livestock which consume agricultural products, then the second sentence
would not only be superfluous, it would also be "self-contradictory and meaningless."
(Augmentation Record p. 9). The District Court reasoned as follows:
However, with such an interpretation, the triggering act of "using the agricultural
product to feed livestock simultaneously give the product its clarified
classification-agricultural product subject to a lien-and strips it of that lien as it
would not extend to the livestock once it is consumed-or "used." Interpreting
language such that it both bestows a category and strips it at the same moment
renders the sentence self-contradictory and meaningless.
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(Augmentation Record p. 9). In a footnote to this passage, the

Court amplifies its point

as follows:
The court notes that Farmers' interpretation would be more reasonable if
the statute had indicated that the 1ien attaches regardless of whether the purchaser
intends to use or ~wilf use the product in the ways described in the second
sentence. However, the statute does not read that way. [Emphasis added]
(Augmentation Record p. 9).

However, because the statute states that the lien attaches to a

product regardless of the purpose for which

agricultural product is used, does not imply that

the lien does not attach to the product until the product is used. The sentence is a statement that
certain events do not affect whether a lien attaches; it is not a statement about when a lien
attaches. In any case, Idaho Code

1803 which immediately follows Idaho Code §45-1802 is

captioned and sets forth "\\lhen lien attaches," which clearly dispels any reason for reading the
second sentence of Section

1802 as having anything to do with when the lien attaches. Thus

plainly read, the second sentence is not self-contradictory and meaningless.
1

Even if one reaches the District Court s conclusion that the second sentence
implies an absurd result unless it is construed to mean that a lien on an agricultural product
attaches to livestock which consume the product, such absurdity does not allow a court to depart
from the plain meaning of an unambiguous sentence. As the Idaho Supreme Cowi has stated in
Verska, if a comi finds that the plain unambiguous meaning of a statute is" patently absurd," it

is not the role of the Comi to rewrite the statute. But this is just what the District Court did in
case.
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The meaning of the second sentence is plain enough: it states that the lien created
under "this chapter" (chapter Eighteen of Title 45) may attach "regardless of whether the
purchaser uses the agricultural product purchased to increase the value of his livestock or
whether he uses the agricultural product purchased to maintain the value, health or status of his
livestock without actually increasing the value of his a,gTicultural product."

Predicating the

attachment of a lien on goods to the use to which the good are put, is not without precedent. The
Uniform Commercial Code, for example, defines consumer goods as "goods that are used or
bought for use primarily for personal, family or household purposes." Idaho Code §28-9- J 02
(23).

But when such goods commence to be used for such purposes is not relevant for

determining when a security interest attaches to those goods.

Likewise, because the second

sentence of Idaho Code §45-1802 states that the lien created attaches regardless of certain
subsequent uses of the goods, it does not imply the lien attaches only when the goods are used.
It simply states that the lien attaches regardless. Thus interpreted the sentence is neither self-

contradictory in its meaning or absurd in its result.
When the second sentence of Idaho Code §45-1802 is read in a plain and
straightforward way, free of the demand and constraint that the section must mean something
very different with the addition of the second sentence than without it, there is nothing in its
plain mea11ing which says that an agricultural commodity lien attaches to livestock.

All the

sentence says is that the lien created in "this chapter," "may attach regardless of whether the
purchaser uses the agricultural product purchased to increase the value of his livestock or
whether he uses the agricultural product purchased to maintain the value, health or status of his
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livestock without actually increasing the value of his agricultural product."

There is nothing in

the plain meaning of this sentence to the effect that the lien may also attach to livestock which
consume an agricultural product. There is no reasonable interpretation of the plain meaning of
the words of the second sentence which leads to the conclusion that the second sentence means
that an agricultural commodity lien attaches to livestock which consume the product.

To

conclude otherwise, moreover, would directly conflict with the plain definition of "agricultural
product" in Idaho Code §45-1801 (1 )-- which does not include livestock-- and the plain meaning
of the first sentence of Idaho Code §45-1802 that the lien created attaches only to an agricultural
product or the proceeds of sale of an agricultural product.
The District Court reasoned that unless the second sentence adds something to the
first sentence of Idaho Code §45-1802, then the second sentence is "superflous" and
"meaningless." (Augmentation Record pp. 8-9). However, ifthe meaning of the second sentence
standing by itself, is plain and unambiguous, then the court is not at liberty to invoke rules of
construction to go beyond or against that plain meaning. If the court had first concluded that the
second sentence were ambiguous, then it would have been appropriate for the court to have
invoked the rule of construction that an amendment to a statute is presumed to change the import
of the statute from what it was prior to the amendment. In this case, however, the District Comi
declined to adopt a straightforward interpretation of tl1e words of the second sentence only
because it reasoned that read in this way, the second sentence would add nothing to the first.
The District Court also concluded that the second sentence was "superfluous"
standing by itself. The Court's reasoning in support of this conclusion is not persuasive. The
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Court reasons, in effect, that if the second sentence simply clarifies that the lien created by the
first sentence attaches to an agricultural product

of how the product is used, then this

means that the lien does not attach to the product until it is used. This is an unwarranted leap of
logic. The sentence states that the lien may attach regardless of whether the product is used to
maintain or increase the value of livestock.

ln other words, it states that the lien may attach

regardless of what the subsequent use of the product might be. If the second sentence had read
that the lien may attach only if and when the purchaser uses the product in a certain way, then the
District Court's reasoning would have a point. But this is plainly not what the second sentence
says and there is no basis whatsoever for the District Court's conclusion that the second sentence
standing by itself is "self-contradictory and meaningless." (Au1:,Tffientation Record p. 9).

F.
The District Court's conclusion that the Agricultural Commodity Dealer's interpretation is
reasonable is wrong.
Having concluded that Fam1ers National Bank's interpretation of the second
sentence is unreasonable, the District Court proceeds to conclude that the Agricultural
Commodity Dealers' (referred to by the Court as "Sellers") interpretation on the other band is
reasonable.

(Augmentation Record p. 10). But again the District Court fails to focus on what

the words of the second sentence plainly say, and attributes a meaning to the second sentence
which goes far beyond the ordinary import of the words of which it is composed. The District
Court stated the most convincing factor it found in finding the sellers' interpretation reasonable
as follows:
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The most convmcmg factor to this court is how the second sentence
implements the word, "uses.'' As identified above, "uses" is the triggering verb in
the second sentence; however, once the agricultural product is 'used' to increase
or maintain the value of livestock, the agricultural product is no long in a state of
livestock feed-it has been ingested and is not distinguishable from the livestock
that ingested it. The second sentence indicates that the agricultural lien attaches
even when this triggering event occurs. To the court, this means that the
agricultural lien attaches to the feed, and continues if commingled with livestock
through the livestock's use-or consumption-regardless of whether the agricultural
product increased the livestock's value, or maintained its value.

(Augmentation Record p. 10). The Comi states that "'uses' is the triggering verb in the second
sentence." A triggering verb may be a novel grammatical concept, but what the District Comi
seems to mean by this is that "uses" refers to the event which causes the lien to attach to
livestock.

But even though the second sentence plainly refers to how a purchaser uses an

agricultural product, the District Comi ends up speaking in tenns of how livestock use an
agricultural product. Apaii from this confusion, the District Comi's point seems to be that at the
moment an agricultural product is ingested by an animal, it is no longer distinguishable from the
animal that ingested it. Again, this is simply not the case. Feed remains identifiable for a while
in the animal's digestive tract, and a considerable amount, molecule for molecule, ends up as
excrement. Does the lien attach to manure as well? And, what about milk and offspring?
It is apparent from the District Comi's analysis that its interpretation of the second

sentence as meaning that a lien on an agricultural product also attaches to an animal which
consumes it, is driven by the fundamental consideration that unless the second sentence expands
the scope of the lien created by the first sentence, it is superfluous. But thus driven, the Comi's
interpretation of the second sentence strays far beyond what can be naturally and easily discerned
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from what is otherwise its plain meaning. The confusion about

verbs and uses is

illustrative. But if the second sentence is plain and unambiguous as it stands, the principle of
statutory construction that an amendment to a statute must be read as changing or adding
something to preexisting law does not apply and there is no reason to strain beyond the plain
meaning of the second sentence merely because as plainly interpreted it adds nothing to the
sentence which precedes it. The Agricultural Commodity Deal

s interpretation of the second

sentence, which is adopted by the District Court, is not reasonable.
The District Court concludes its analysis of the meaning of the second sentence
by noting that not only does its interpretation not render the second sentence superfluous, but it
also "benefits the intended protected class of an agricultural lien-the agricultural producers."
(Augmentation Record p. 11 ). However, if indeed the second sentence is unambiguous as the
District concluded, then the extent to which the sentence as interpreted furthers legislative or
public policy is inelevant as this Court has held in Stonebrook Construction. LLC. This is but a
final instance of the District Court's inclination to muddle the interpretation of an unambiguous
statute with principles of statutory construction.

G.
The second sentence is unambiguous and Farmers National Bank's interpretation of that
sentence is reasonable.
As reflected by the amicus briefs which have been filed in this case, the issues in
this case

beyond the interests of the litigants. As United States Bankruptcy Judge Pappas said

at the beginning of his decision in a case in which the central issue was identical to the one in
this case-how the second sentence of Idaho Code §45-1802 is to be interpreted- "the potentially
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implications of the Cou1i's holding will likely impact many participants in the agricredit

As a result, the stakes in this case are substantial." In Re Goedhart & Goedhart.

03.3 IBCR l

, 167 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2003).

A copy of Judge Pappas' Memorandum of

Decision in that case is attached to this Brief as Appendix B. With the awareness of that fact,
Judge Pappas held in his thorough and well reasoned decision that, like the first sentence, the
second sentence of Idaho Code §45-1802 is unambiguous and that the plain meaning of the
second sentence does not

the scope or kinds of property to which an agricultural

commodity lien can attach. It simply clarifies the first sentence:
The second sentence of the statute, added in 1989, is also plain on its
It clarifies the first sentence. It explains that the statutory agricultural commodity
lien created by the first sentence shall attach to the agricultural product, and to the
proceeds from the sale of that product, without regard to whether the purchaser
uses the commodity for either of two different purposes, namely, to increase the
value of livestock or to maintain the value of livestock. Again, \vhile it easily
could have done so, the Legislature did not utilize language in the l 989
amendment to Idaho Code §45-1802 that expands the scope or kinds of property
to which a commodity lien will attach.

Ibid. at

170. Judge Pappas goes on to note that interpreting the second sentence according

to its plain meaning does not render the sentence superfluous:
Construing the statue according to its plain meaning does not render any
portion of the commodity lien law superfluous .... [citation omitted]. Granted,
interpreting the second sentence as a clarification that a commodity lien can attach
to the agricultural product or the proceeds from its subsequent sale,
notwithstanding the purchaser's use of the agricultural product may not effect any
extensive change in the reach or impact of the statute. However, such an
interpretation is consistent with the import of the language of the statute.

Ibid. at pages 171-172.

H.
Even if Idaho Code §45-1802 is ambiguous, applying the rules of statutory construction
does not change the result.

In his decision in Jn Re: Goedhart & Goedhart, Judge Pappas reasons that even if
the addition of the second sentence to Idaho Code §45-1802 rendered the statute ambiguous, and
the court considered "the full panoply of statutory construction tools, the interpretation given the
statute by the Comi would be no different." Ibid at page 171. Looking at Chapter 18 of Title 45
as a whole, Judge Pappas observes that not only in Idaho Code §45-1802, but also Idaho Code
§45-1803 and I 805 "the Idaho Legislature indicated its intent that a commodity lien attach only
to the agricultural product sold and to the proceeds from a subsequent sale of the product, but not
to any other types of property." Ibid at page 171. In addition, Judge Pappas notes that the
definition of "agricultural product" in Idaho Code §45-180 l ( l ), which the Idaho Legislature also
amended in 1989, was amended to extend the definition to include agricultural products which
had been processed into feed. Had the legislature intended at that time to also extend the lien to
livestock which consumed an agricultural product, it could have done so in the amendment to the
definition, but it did not. Ibid at page 171. Judge Pappas also notes that to read Idaho Code §451 802 as extending the lien to livestock which consume an agricultural product would, in order to
maintain consistency in tbe statute, require a detennination that Idaho Code §§45-1803 and 1805
were amended by implication as well. This he points out would nm contrary to the rule that
"Statutory amendment by implication is disfavored and will not be inferred absent clear
legislative intent." Ibid at page 171.

(See Thomas

11•

Medical Center Physicians, P.A., 13 8

Idaho 200, 209, 61 P.3d 557, 566 (2002). Finally, Judge Pappas concludes that "The legislative
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history from the 1989 session offers no definitive insight into the legislature's intent because the
commentators offered inconsistent views on the amendment's goal." Ibid at page 171.

CONCLUSION
The Court should reverse the Amended Judgment entered by the trial court on
August 29, 2012, which based upon the Memorandum Decision Re: Plaintiffs Motion for
Summary Judgment, granted declaratory judgment including costs and attorney's fees to Hull
Fanns, Inc.: Tim Thornton; Lewis Becker; Jack McCall; and Dan Carter.
Declaratory Judgment should be entered in favor of Fanners National Bank,
including costs and attorneys fees, declaring that Idaho Code §45-1 802 does not provide that an
agricultural commodity dealer lien on an agricultural commodity extends to the livestock which
consume that commodity or to the proceeds of sale of the livestock, and that Farmers National
Bank's security interest in the proceeds from the sale of cows belonging to Green River Dairy, is
a first priority lien.
DATED this

day of November, 2012.
COLEMAN, RITCHIE & CLUFF

/.JOµ}J S. RITCHIE
1__p.1tomey for Plaintiff-Counterdefendant-Appellant

Fanners National Bank
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APPENDIX
...

(Agricultural Commodity Dealer Liens Claimed and
Filed by the Agricultural Commodity Dealers)

1. Hull Farms, Inc.:
a. State of Idaho Notice of Lien in Agricultural Products - Fonn C-1
filed with the Idaho Secretary of State on August 4, 2011, Fi 1ing
Number Cl 549:
Purchaser: Herculano Joseph Alves
Claimant: Hull
Amount: $106,344.17
Delivery Dates: May
2011, to June 26, 2011
Crop: alfalfa hay

b. State of Idaho Notice of Lien in Agricultural Products - Form C-1
filed with the Idaho Secretary of State on August 4, 2011, Filing
Number Cl
Purchaser: Frances Marie Alves
Claimant: Hull Farms Inc.
Amount: $106,344.17
Delivery Dates: May 26, 2011, to June 26, 2011
Crop: alfalfa hay

c. State of Idaho -- Notice of Lien in Agricultural Products Fonn C-1
filed with the Idaho Secretary of State on August 4, 2011, Filing
NumberC1551:
Purchaser: Berkie Joseph Alves
Claimant: Hull Farms Inc.
Amount: $106,344 .1 7
Delivery Dates: May 26, 2011, to June 26, 2011
Crop: alfalfa hay
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d. State of Idaho Notice of Lien in Agricultural Products - Fonn C-1
filed with the Idaho Secretary of State on August 4, 2011, Filing
Number Cl
Purchaser: Green River Dairy
Claimant: Hull Fanns Inc.
Amount: S106,344.17
Delivery Dates: May 26, 2011, to June 26, 2011
Crop: alfalfa hay
The total amount of those claims is $106,344.17.

2. Dan Carter:
a. State of Idaho Notice of Lien in Agricultural Products - Form C-1
filed with the Idaho Secretary of State on January 5, 2011, Filing
Number C 1528:
Purchaser: Green River Dairy
Claimant: Ernest Daniel Carter
Amount: $10,606.75
Delivery Dates: October 24, 2010
Crop: hay

b. State of Idaho Notice of Lien in Agricultural Products -··· Form C-1
filed with the Idaho Secretary of State on January 5, 2011, Filing
Number C1529:
Purchaser: Green River Dairy. LLC
Claimant: Ernest Daniel Carter
Amount: $10,606.75
Delivery Dates: October 24, 20 l 0
Crop: hay
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c. State of Idaho Notice of Lien in Af,'Ticultural Products - Form C-1
filed with the Idaho Secretary of State on January 5, 2011, Filing
Number Cl 530:
Purchaser: Herculano Joseph Alves
Claimant:
Daniel Carter
Amount: $10,606.75
Delivery Dates: October 24, 2010
Crop: hay
d. State of Idaho -- Notice of Lien in Agricultural Products Fonn
filed with the Idaho Secretary of State on January 5, 201], Filing
Number Cl 531:
Purchaser: Frances Marie
Claimant: Ernest Daniel Carter
Amount: $10,606. 7 5
Delivery Dates: October 24, 2010
Crop: hay

e. State of Idaho Notice of Lien in Agricultural Products ~ Fonn C-1
filed with the Idaho Secretary of State on April
2011, Filing Number
Cl543:
Purchaser: Green River Dairy
Claimant: Carter Hay and Livestock
Amount: $20,006.00
Delivery Dates: January 1, 2011, to February 1, 2011
Crop: hay

APPELLANTS BRIEF - APPENDIX A 27

f

State of Idaho Notice of Lien in Agricultural Products
filed with the Idaho Secretary of State on April 7, 2011,
c 1544:

Form
Number

Herculano Alves
Claimant: Carter Hay and Livestock
Amount: $20,006.00
Delivery Dates: January 1, 2011, to February 1, 201 l
Crop: hay
The total amount of those claims is $30,612.75.

a. State of Idaho - Notice of Lien in Agricultural Products - Form C-1
filed with the Idaho Secretary of State on September 23, 20 I l, Filing
Number Cl 556:
Purchaser: Frances Alves
Claimant: Lewis Becker
Amount: $4,815.00
Delivery Dates: June 20, 2011, to June 30, 2011
Crop: wheat
b. State of Idaho Notice of Lien in Agricultural Products Form
filed with the Idaho Secretary of State on September 23, 2011,
Number Cl
Purchaser: Herculano Joseph Alves
Claimant: Lewis Becker
Amount: $4,815.00
Delivery Dates: June 20, 2011, to June 30, 2011
Crop: wheat
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c. State of Idaho - Notice of Lien in Agricultural Products - Form C-1
filed with the Idaho Secretary of State on September 23, 2011, Filing
Number Cl 558:
Purchaser: Frances Alves
Claimant: Lewis Becker
Amount: $3,840.00
Delivery Dates: June 4, 2011, to June 30, 2011
Crop: hay

d. State of Idaho - Notice of Lien in Agricultural Products - Form C-1
filed with the Idaho Secretary of State on September 23, 2011, Filing
Number Cl 559:
Purchaser: Herculano Joseph Alves
Claimant: Lewis Becker
Amount: $3,840.00
Delivery Dates: June 4, 2011, to June 30, 2011
Crop: hay
The total amount of those claims is $8,655.00.
4. Jack McCall:
a. State of Idaho -- Notice of Lien in Agricultural Products - Fann C-1
filed with the Idaho Secretary of State on October 17, 2011, Filing
Number C 1560:
Purchaser: Green River Dairy, LLC
Claimant: Jack McCall
Amount: $19,696.25
Delivery Dates: March 15, 2011, to May 26, 2011
Crop: hay

APPH~LANTS

BRIEF - APPENDIX A - 29

b. State of Idaho ?\otice of Lien in Agricultural Products Form C-1
filed with the Idaho Secretary of State on October 17, 2011, Filing
Number Cl 561:
WWW

Purchaser: Herculano Alves
Claimant: Jack McCall
Amount: $19,696.25
Delivery Dates: March I 2011, to May
Crop: hay

2011

The total amount of those claims is S19,696.25.
5. Tim Thornton:
a. State of Idaho -- Notice of
in Agricultural Products -- Form C-1
filed with the Idaho Secretary of State on October 18, 2011, Filing
NumberC1563:
Purchaser: Herculano Joseph Alves
Claimant: Tim Thornton
Amount: $20,096.54
DeliveryDates: June 2011,to.Tuly21,2011
Crop: hay

b. State of Idaho Notice of Lien in Agricultural Products Form C-1
filed with the Idaho
of State on October 18, 2011, Filing
Number Cl564:
Purchaser:
River Dairy
Claimant: Tim Thornton
Amount: $20,096.54
Delivery Dates: June 2, 2011, to July 21, 2011
Crop: hay
The total amount of those claims is $20,096.54.
(R. Vol. IL pp. 387-409).
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Here, thL: Cour1 concludes
tlie
JCtion in
Debtcm:s clnim for damages, and
consequently, the clwracler or any recovery he may ::ichicve The
m:ilpracuce action wouid not have beer• filed "'bu! for" the bodily
i njurie;; sustained by Debtor, as
in the
fiction
l n that sense, Debtor seeb to recover from hrs former attorneys
those damages he would have recovt:red ;n the
acuon
had :I been properly
If Debtor had recovered in the
urnkrlying personal
those proceeds would have been exempt under Idaho Code § 11
604(! )\c), Thus. a:iy rcc:nvery in Lile
act10n anribuwblc
to Debtor's physirnl miuries may properly be claimed exempt under
ldahc Code§ I l-604(1)(c).
Without regard to the statute examined by the Panel m
, the Court has previously ruled that ldal10 law limw, any
excm;xion claim to a debtor's damages for actual bodily
In re Lee, 962 LB.CR. 84, 86 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1996)
the term "bodily injury" did not encompass purely" ri1ental or
emotional injury, but is limited to actual physical injury to the
and the conse4uences thereof). Jn addition, the funds in question
rnust also be ''reasonably necessary" for Debtors' or his
support. Jn re Nielsen, 97.4 LB,CR 107, 108 (Bankr D. Idaho
1997) (holding that annuity payments paid to debtor for medical
expenses, when those payments were not reasonably necessary for
her or her dependent's support, were not exempt). Whether Debtors
are successful in securing a recovery in the legal malpractice action,
and whether that recovery is att;ibutable to a bodily injury and is
also reasonably necessary for Debtors' support, remains to be seen.
An evidentiary hearing may be required at a later date to determine
the answer to these important questions.

or

IV, Conclusion.
As matter of law, Debtors can not assert an exemption in any
recovery from the
action under either Idaho Code § I ii i-603(5). However, Debtors may properly claim an
in the
of the
malpractice claim uncler
Idaho Code§ I l-604(!)(c), but only if Debtors can establish that
such
represents
for a bodily injury ar:d that
it is reasonably necessary for the support of Debtors and their
Becm1se al lins time there is no settlement or recovery,
Debtors obviously can not make such a showir;g, and me Court
cnnnol make final
of Trustee's objection LO Debtors' s
claim. If Debtors receive a recovery from tile action, and
i r the pnrties cannot otherwise resolve the respective rights of the
estate <ind Debtors to such recovery, Trustee may
renotice his
for an
hcanng. No !lnal order will

JIM D. PAPPAS
CHIEF US BANKRUPTCY JUDGE

Vol. 03, No. 44
IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COlm.T
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO
Cite as: 03.3 IRCR 167

In Re
COEDHART & GOEDHART,
HAl<'T' DALI< Y,
Debtor.

ci

PARTNERSHIP. dba GOOD

NWT, INC. <md EVANS GRAIN, FEED AND SEED COMPANY,
an fdaho corporation,
Pi<1in1iffs,

GOEDHART & GOEDHART, a partnership d/b/a GOOD HART
DAIRY and WELLS FARGO BANK, National Association,
Defend ams.

Case No. 02-41638
Case No. 02-6342
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

Richard D, Greer.wood, GREENWOOD & BRODY, Twin
Palls, Idaho, Attorney for Plainliff NWT Inc.
Kimbell D.
JONES GLEDHILL HESS FUHRMAN
BRADBURY & EIDEN, Boise, Idaho, Attorney for Plaintiff
Evans Grain, Feed and Seed
Brent T. Robinson, LINC & ROBINSON, Rupert, Idaho,
Attorney for Defendant Cloedhart & Goedhart.

Larry E. Prince, HOLLAND & HART, Boise, Idaho, Attorney
for Defendant Wells

Bank, National Association.

Introduction
This Memorandum of Decision disposes of cross-motions for
summarv
filed in this consolidated adversary proceeding.
AL issue ..is whether Idaho Code§ 45-180 I cl, seq,, the Idaho statutes
governing agricultural commodity liens, extend the reach of such
liens to the dairy cows (and to the milk
by those cows) that
consume agricultural producto
to a
lien, While
yet <mother decision from Lhis Court concerning stawtory
constrnction 111ay hardly seem cause for excitement, the potentially
faHeaching 1mplirnt.ions of the Court's
will likely
markels As a result, the stakes
many participants in the
in this c::ise arc substumial.
To dispose of the issues in this action, the Court must endeavm
to assess the
or the statutes This can be a delicate task.
Judges cal led upon tc apply a statute
wisdom 10 those who write the statute.
by a reviewing cou;t in
and efficacy of the

' A;; nnc famous jurist describer! the challenge of construing a srmute·

The .1udgc must always remember that he should
no further than he is sure the govermncn: would
have gone. had it been faced with tile
before

i :o prese111 in tl11s case hec;mse the Court If, inv11ed tu
the
collective JUclgmenl of the ldalw
and 10 1111rudt: upon
pr
more properly conducted in the Statehouse, no: tlie
courthouse The Courl decline:, Lhar inv1t<HHHl,

Procedural Background
Goedhar: & Gocdhan C'Debtor"), a pat1nersb1p bcLweer;
m1J 'v11chae1 Goedhan,
H dairy farm m Wende1L Idaho,
' Debtor filed for rc:ilef
under th1: trade name "Good Han
1111dr:::,
l l of the
Code on August 2'.1, 2002, Al
tha: wne, Debtor wac: indebted to, among others, \Vc:lis Fargo H<tnk.
,~:i:iunal A.'sociation ("Bank"): NWT, Inc, ("N\VT"L and Evmis
("Evans Grnin"J
Crain. Feed and
N\VT commenced an ml versury
On D(:cember
the B;mk and Dcblllr as def endams, scekrng 3
delerflllllClliOn of the
and extcnl of the SlalUlOry lien
it purportedly heid nn Debtor's
cows and milk, as well as the
proceeds from the sale of both, by virtue of lduho Code~ 45-1802,
Ac'v No. 02-6342. Docket No. l ln response. the Bank, wh1eh
holds a perfected U CC Anicle Nine security imerest in the same
Adv. No, 02-6342.
collatera:. filed a motion for summa:·y
Docket No. 10. The Bank rnnlends NWT's statutory lien does not
NWT
atwch Lo any of the collateral al issue, Not
disagrees, and filed a cross-motrnn for summary
Adv,
No, 02-6?142. Doeket No. 15.
Evan;; Grain cornmeneed a separate
on
January 30, 2003, claiming it loo held a statutory lien on Debtor's
cows, milk, and cash sale proceeds under Idaho
§ 45.
1802, Adv. No. 03-6031, Docket No. I, Evans Grain also
that Debtor improperly converted the collateral in which Evans
Grain had a lien. ld . .lust as NWT had done, Evans Grain named
the Bank and Debtor as defendants. The Bank moved for summary
that the statue did not gram Evans Grain a valid
lien on the cows, milk and proceeds securing the Bank's claim,
Adv. No.
I, Docket l\io. 12.
In furtherance of the parties' stipulation, the Court consolidated
on .lune 19, 2003. under A,dvcrsary
Docket No, 30. Prior to entry of the order
the actions, but after execution of the stipulaLion,
Evans Grain filed its own motion for summary judgmem 3 Docket
Ne. 22.
The Court conducted a hearing on the various motions for
summary judgment on June 19, 3t which counsel for all the parties,

irdudm~ !JehtD:. arpearecl m1cl pmvidecl argumenL, Tile Coun luok
the issue.s rm.sed hy the mot1uns under advisement. aml ha;, carefully
C(llEiclered the subm1ss1rn10. and arpHnenLf, D the paruco., This ~'.Ji
Mcrnorandum disposes of tlie pendmg muciuns.
Undisputed Facts
The followmg fact.' appear undisputed 111 the record,
Dditur borrowed muney from U1:- Bank. Tll scc:ure !l<, prnmisc
10 repiiy lb loanf. from the Bank, Debt<ir granted the Bank
inlercsl in, amung it:, uthcr assets, all its presenl and future dairy
of
cuws. mill;, and any cash proceecls received from the
tt1c
or milk.
'JI 15, Docket No. l, Adv No. 03-6031,
[; appr:ar;,
that thl'. Bm1k rerfectecl it'> seeurny 11llcres1 in
Debtor's dairy cow:, and milk bdore NWT or Evan•. Ci min ,,uld and
products w Debtor, At the: tllnc oi thr:
Dl'.btor owed tile Bank approximately $5.8
rnilliun. Def.'s Statcrnen'. of
Fact,~ 3. Dockc:t No. 11
NWT buys
commudnie~ from the farmers who
raise. them, and then sclls those cornrnod111e' to !ls custorncrs,
includmg
farmers. Aff of Hamby, ~ 4, Docket No. 2:.J.
Therefore, NWT an
commodity dealer" as defim~d
by Idaho Code § 45-l 80 I '
in May, 2001. N'NT sold and
delivered canola pellets, used as cattle feed, to Dcbtor. Id. al~[ 5.
Debtor failed lo pay for the deliveries NWT made tc Debtor between
April 25 and July 9, 2002. As a rcsult. Debtor owecl NWT
£20,021,04, Id, at~ 7; Ex, B. NWT thereafter timely filed wntlen
claims of"commodity dealer liens" with the Idaho
of State
as provided in Idaho Ccide § 45-180 I eL
for the
balance
owed by Debtor. AfL of Greenwood, Doeket No. J 6, These claims
of lien purpom:dly covered Debtor's dairy cattle, milk, and any
&\,;
canola pellets still on hand at Debtor's farm. id, at Ex. A
Evans Grain is also an agricultural
dealer as defined 'ff
by Idaho Code § 45-1801 (2). Evans Grain sold Debtor whey.
rnttonseed, and com distillers, all of which Debtor used
feed. Aff. of Blauer, ~ 7, Docket No, 24. Prior lo the
Evans Grain made deliveries to Debtor valued at $70,52 LOO, for
On November 15, 2002, Evans Grain also
recorded
dealer liens with the Secretary of State that
to attaeh to Debtor's dairy cattle, milk, and any cottonseed
rP.rr1;i1n,1no at Debtor's faim. Aff of Counsel, Ex, A., Docket No. 23.
On May 19, 2003, this Court entered 3n order
Bank relief from the automatie stay with respect to Debtor's
herd, milk;and any feed on hand, C:a,<;e No. Q2.t, I 6J8. Docket No

··

,

ilim. If he 1s in doubt.. he mus\ swp, for he cannot
lcll thal lhe conf1lcling imcrcsls in the wcicty for

which he speaks would have
10 u just result.
ever. Lh ough he is surr' that he know,, what the JUSt
rcsulr should be. He is not io wbstilute cvc1' Ins
,1us1er will for theirs; otherwise ii would noi be the
common will which prev;tils. aJl(! 10 thal extent the
people would no! govern.

Learned Hand. How Far is a Judge Free"' Rc11dcr111!' o Dec/,1w11:, lll The
Sp11i111( LibcrlY.' I1aper.1, and Addresses or Le11mcd }·fond 79. 84 Orting
Dilliard cd,, New York Vinlagc Book; 1960)

All frn1hcr docket ref'erences will be to Adv Nu 07.·6342. unless
01herw1sc inrlicntcd,

Grnw actually filccl its motion for stnnmary Judgment rn the
adversary proceeding inilrnted by NVv'T before lhe Coun entered the order
consolidating the lwt1 aclions The Cou11 perceives nv harm in trcullng the
l11Cl/l0l1 <IS rrnrcrJy filed Under these CJJ'ClllllSlal\CCS
,,\,PPFT T ,,\,NT"" Rl~IFF- APPFNDTX R _ \7

" For

rurpuscs

of

ldaho Code ~ &5. J 80 I el. seq.:

'Agricultural cornmodity dealer' mctms 'my person
wlio con'.racls for or sohclls any agricuhural product
from an agricultural producer or negotiates !lie
conslgnmcm
purchase of any agriculwral product.
01 receives for t:nlc. rc;;ule or shipme111 fnr storage,
pmccssing. cleaning or reconditioning, auy
agricullurnl

pmduct, or who huys

tlurin~

an)

calendar yea;. at least ten l110J1&and dollars ($10,000)
w011li of agricuhw;il prod11cls from the prnduccr or

producers of the commodity. Agricullurnl
comn1odity dealer sh,tll no: Jllcan a person wJio
purcha.,cs ugricul1urnl rrnclocts for Im own 11.,e
seed or feed,
ldah0 Corl~§ 45-J 80 I CJ

e,

cru rncR

IN RE GOEDiiART & COEDHAfff
I ]5' Shortly tlicrcaltcr, the U.S. Trustee filed Cl 1TJotiun to convert
Dcbtor',s Chapter 11 case to one under Chapter 7, or in tk
alterna[lve, tu dismiss the case, because Debtor was no longer
operating :1 dairy farm. Case No. 02-41638. Duckl'.1 No. 149. ThJI
mouun remains pending at this time."
On the b<Jsis or this record, the Court presumes al I of Debtor's
cows and milk have been, or shortly will be, soid. So, too. the Court
confidently assumes. although the record docs not demonstrnte ii.
that tile sale. pruceec!s arc insufficicrn to satisl·y in lul I the just dchts
ol the Bank. NWT. and Evans Grain. Wliik none or the pmties
discuss in the recurd the status or any rem11ining feed snld to Debtor
by NWT or Evans Grain, and while the Bank apparently does not
challenge the priority or the commodity dealers' liens in that reed.
che Court also assumes there is an inadequnte amount or feed or:
hand to pay the dealers' accounts. Thus, the dispute in this acllon
concerns which creditors are entitled to the cash procee.ds from the
sale or Debtor's dairy cows and miTk. and which creditors must look
elsewhere, if al all. for payment. Seen in this fashion, the action
presents a classic bankruptcy confrontation.
The Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the
pleadings, depositions, answers to imerrogatories, and admissions
on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving parry is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c);
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7056 (incorporating Fed. R. Civ. P 56 for
application in adversary proceedings). See also Elsaesser v. Central
Pre-Mix Concrete Ca. (In re Pioneer Constr., Inc.), 01.2 l.B.C.R.
66. 66 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2001); Esposito v. Nayes (Jn re Lake
Cauntrv investments, LLC). 255 B.R. 588. 596-97 (Bankr D. Idaho
2000)
The parties agree that all material facts in this matter are
undisputed, at le:ist for purposes of disposition of the pending
motions. Simply put. the Court must therefore decide which of the
parties is entitled to the paramount protection or the law_
Disposition of the [ssues
A. [daho Code § 45-1802 and the positions of the parties
In 1983, the Idaho Legislature enacted what became Idaho
Code § 45-1802, a statute to protect "agricultural commodity
producers" and "agric.u ltural commodity dealers" by providing them
a statutory lien for the unpaid price or "agricultural prnducts" 7 sold

' By stipulation of the panics during the hearing and pursuant to Fed. R.
EvJCI. 201. ihe Court lakes .iuclicial notice of its fJlcs and records m Debtor's

to others The statute origi11ally provided:
An agnculturnl commodity producer or cm ;igricultural
commodity dc;iler who sells an agricultural product has a
lien on the agricultural prnclucr or the proceeds of the sale
or the agriculturnl product until payment is made i11 full.
/\ct ol Apr. 12, 1983. ch. 202, ~ I, 1983 Idaho Sess. Laws :'>49
(amended 1989). In 1989. the Idaho Legislature rnrn~nded the stmute
by adding a second sentence. The new provision read:
The I ien cre:ned ir. this chapter m:1y attach regardless or
whether the purchaser USl'.S the agricultural prnduct
purcha;,ed to increase the value or his livestock or whether
he uses the agricultural product purchased to maintain the
value, health or status or his livestock without actually
increasing the value of his agricultural product.
Act of Apr. 4, 1989, ch. 299, §I. 1989 Idaho Seso.. Liws 746
(codified as amended Idaho Code § 45-1802).'
Evans Grain and NWT contend the language of § 45-1802,
particularly the second sentence added by the Idaho Legislature in
1989, extends the lien arising on their sale of agricultural products
to Debtor beyond the agricultural products themselves. to include
Debtor's dairy cows, the milk those cows produce, and any cash
proceeds received upon sale of the cows or milk. Conversely, the
Bank insists the language of Idaho Code § 45-1802 allows the
commodity sellers a lien only on the agricultural products sold, and
on any proceeds generated from a subsequent sale of the agricultural
products, but not on any other property.
B. Principals of statutory construction
A federal coun inte111reting a state statute must rely upon the
enacting state's rules of statutory construction, as articulated by the

tame mustards, rapeseed. flaxseed, leguminous seed
or other small seed. or any other agricultural
commodity, including any of the foregoing, whether
cleaned, processed. treated, reconditioned or whether
mixed. rolled or combined in any fashion or by any
means tn create a prnduet used as a111mal, poultr-y or
fish feed.
Idaho Code~ 45-180i(I). It is undisputed that the products sold by NWT
ancl Evan.s Gram to Debtor were "agricultural prnducts" covered by the lien
statutes.

bankrnpLcy case. Case No 02-d 1638.
' The statute currently provides:
" The Cour1 previously notified counsel for the panics that ii would defer
entry of a decision on the summary judgment rnotio11s until the U.S.
Trustee's motion had been resolved. See Letter lo Counsel dated July 7.
2003. Docket No. 31 However, Lhe Coun 1econsidcred its reluctance lo
act. The issues raised here cU'e impmtant 111 this case a11d in others pending
bel'ore the Coult. If the bankruptcy case convens Lo Chapter 7. the issues
will remain. Moreover. given the advanced procedural stalu.s of this
adversary proceeding, ancl the efforts <expcnclcd hy the par1ies and the Court

An agricultural commodity producer or an
agricultural cummodily dealer who sells, or deliveis
under contract or lnilrnent, an agncultural product
has a lien on tile agricultural product o" the proceeds
of the sale of the agncultural product as prnvidecl in
section 4.~-1804. Idaho Code. The lien created in
this chapter may anach regardless of whether the
purchaser uses the agncultural product purchased Lo
inc1easc the value or his livestock or whether he uses
the agricultural product purchased to rnaintarn the
value. health or status of his livestock without
actually increasing the value of his agricuituraJ
prnclucl.

1n cnnnect1on with the summary _1uclg111erH molions, 1t wnulcl be most

econom1cal for this Court to Jecicle the pc.nding rnollons. even though Lile
ba11k111ptcy case may be clisrnissed.
1~·or

p1irposcs of lrlaho Code § cl'i-180 I er. seq.·
'AgriculturnJ product' means wheat. corn, oats.
barley, rye. lentils. soybeans. gram sorghum, dry
beans <lllll [lC<l.'.-., (Jeans..

safnciwer.
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45-180:'. f\ny fur1her changes

l 9R9 or other amendments are not

~tissue

lo

the statute made by rhc

m this action.

en.:'' mer<
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courb of thm state. Sec. e.g., 111 re Ltircs. i 8S FJd 1166, 1168 (CJ"'
Cir. 1999) (rc:lying on ldahu rules of ccmstruction in 111terpreLing
ldaho's exemption Jaws) In Idaho, ''statutory 1merprelallon begim
with the literal words of thl'. statute, and this language should be
given its plain, obvious, and ratiunal meaning." Scwurd i Poe/fie
Hide & Fur Depm, GS f'.3d :i:11. 533 (Idaho 2003) (1ntcrnal
qummiuns and cicmiom omiued) If, however. the language of a
statute is ambiguous. ;; court may employ other Louis in deciphering
the statutc"s meaning. including reJcrcnce to other statutes
concemrng the samt: subject matter if the statute 1s hut one pan or a
larger statutory scheme; tile context of the statutory language; the
public policy advancc:d by the statute: and any pc:ninenl legislative
history. Idaho\'. Pac/ore!:, 5 I P 3ci 443. 44(1 (Idaho Ct. App 200:\J:
Jdulw \.Cudd, 51 P.3d 439, 441 (Idaho Ct. App. 2002) ("iW]t: also
look tu other stawtes in tht same title or act relating tu the same
subject matter and read them together. in urdcr to discern thl'.
legislative mlt:nt"J
As for 1dentify111g ambiguity:
A statute is ambiguous when the meaning is so doubtful
or obscure thal "reasonable minds might be uncertain or
disagree as to its meaning .
However, ambiguity is not
because
different
possible
established
merely
interpretations are presented to a court. II th is were the
case then all statutes tJ-1at are the subject of litigation could
be considered ambiguous
[A] statute is not
ambiguous merely because an astute mind can devise
more than one interpretation of it ...

BJ-IA Invs, Inc. v. Ciry of Boise, 63 P.3d 482, 484 (Idaho 2003)
(internal quotations and citations omitted)
In construing an
ambiguous statute, "constmctions that would lead to absurd or
unreasonably harsh results are disfavored," Friends of Farm to
Markei v. Valley Countv, 46 P.3d 9, 14 (Idaho 2002) (quoting
Gavica v. Hanson, 608 P.'.2d 861, 863 (Idaho 1980)), as are
constructions that render statutory language superfluous or
insignificant. Id. Regarding amendments to statutes, il must be
presumed that the legislature intended to clarify, strengthen or make
some change to existing law. Seward, 65 P.3d at 534.
Finally. while statutes creatmg lien rights are to be liberally
construed "with a view to effect tl1eir objects and promote Jl!Slice,"
Bo leer v. Boren, 934 P.2d 951, 96 l (Idaho Ct. App. 1997)
(interpreting mechanic's lien stat.lite ancl quoting Me1ropo!i1an Life
Ins. Co. v. Firs/ Sccuril» Bank of Idolw, 491 P.2cl 1261, 1265
(1971 )), "tl1is rule. . does not permit the Court Lo create a lien
where none exists or was intended by the legislature." L & W
Sr<JlfJh· Corp. l» Chari rand Fwnih Tmst, 40 P.ld 96, I 0 l (Idaho
2003) (internal citations omiuccl).
C. Interpreting Idaho Code ~ 45-1802
NWT and Evans Grain must acknowledge that ldaho Code~
4'\-1802 clues nol exprl'.ssly 1mivicle that rn1 agricultural cornmoclity
lien extends beyond Lile agricullural products solcl, yet alone to
cows. milk, or cash proceeds. Instead, they argue that the stalctte,
read as a whole, is ambiguous, and when examined carefully, it
becomes appilrcnt lhat the Legislature rncanl for the lirn to c:<tcnd
beyond agricultural products. However. in construing what the
statute means, Lhc Court's analysis must begin wilh whal the slatulc
SO_)'.\.

The first sentence of amended Idaho Code \i 45-1802 is clear
It creates a lien in favor of agricultural
and unambiguous.
commodity producers (i.e .. Lhe farmers whc1 produce the products)
ancl agricnltura! commodity dcalcr·s (e.g .. the cattle feed snppliers in
this case). Thal lien extends to the agricultural products sold a11d lo
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t I 1e proceeds from a subsequent sak or the agriculLural procluct
Tc; 1llustrnte the extenl or thl'. lien. one need only imagine <1
farmer who raises and sells com Lo a Jiveslod: feed dealer on credl\ ~
A., a rl'.sult oi that lrans<iction, the farmer 1s gra!llt:d a statutory lien
crn the corn while it is in the dealer's possession When the de~1ler
sells L11e com Lo another (say. tu a fetd Jut), the farmer's lien extend;:
Lo any cash proceeds thc dealer received from Lhe sale. ln addition.
at this poml, a staLUtory lien anses in favor of the deakr on the corn
al the feed Illl.
In this context. "agricultural product" is a term or art Lhat is
specii'ically defined in Idaho Cude§ 45-1801(1; for purposes of
identifying the eoll ateral Lo which the commoc\1ty i1e11 created i11
Idaho Code ~ 45-1802 mc1y atLach. When the Legislature ong1rn1lly
drafted this statute. it rnuld h~1vc provided wilhin Lh1: statutory
defmitiun of agricultural product thai the lien would at:.ach lO
livestod: that consume the agricultural commodity. or the proceeds
or products of thal livestock. such as milk produced hy duiry cows
So, too, the Legislature could have later added langui.!ge in Idaho
Code ti 45-1802 Lo extend the reach of the lien to animals that
ccmsumt ag:icullural products already suh_jecl LO '' lien. The
Legislature did neither. This is significant.
As stated above. the first sentence of Idaho Cock § 45-1802 is
clear and unamh1guous. Therefore, it ts unnecessary. and it wouid
he inappropriate, for the Court to resort LO any of the various tools
of statutory construction to divine any meaning beyond giving the
language employed by the Legislature its plain and ordinary
meaning. The Court must presume the Legislature said what it
meant and meant only what it said.
The second sentence or the statute, added in 1989. is also plain
on its face. It clarifies the first sentence. It explains that the ~'
statutory agricultural commodity lien created by the first sentence
shall attach to the agricultural product, and to the proceeds from the
sale of that product, without regard to whether the purchaser uses the
commodity for either of two different purposes, namely, to increase
the value of livestock or to maintain the value of livestock. Again,
while it easily could have done, so, the Legislature did nm utilize
language in the l 989 amendment to Idaho Code § 45-J 802 that
expands the scope or kinds of property to which a commodity lien
will attach.
Admittedly, the reference to livestock in the second sentence of
ldaho Code§ 45-1802, when one considers the absence of any other
s11ch refercnces in the lien statutes, is perhaps curious. and the
Legislature's goal in making this change has been the subject of
debate by the parties in tlm action. However, while NWT and Evans
Grain argue otherwise, the amendmenl to lclal10 Code § 45-1802 did
not render the statute ambiguous simply because their creative
lawyers are abk Lu develop alternative explanations for lhc reference
to livestock in the second sentence. To be sure. Lhe con:;tructiun
urged by NWT and Evans Grain. that Lhc .second sentence was
intended to extend the commuclity lien lo any liveslock consuming
calllc feed. as well as to Lhe milk produced by those t:atlle. provides
more potent protection for Lhc unpaid comrnodily dealer. But, under
Idaho law, statutes that arc not ambiguous need not be comtrued in
Lhe most poweriul or far-reaching manner. Morl'.ovcr. ns nolcd
above. whiil'. lien statules should be liberally construc!d, such a
construction can not include creating a lien where none exists. L &
W Su11I1IY Cmv. 40 f'.3d at I Ol. Rather, the second sentence of
ldal10 Code§ 45-1802 musl be read so as to give effect lCJ the plain, ~
obvious. and ralional meaning of the tcxl Seward, 65 P.3d at 5'.1:1.
Constming the statute according LO its plain meaning does not
render any portion or the commodity lien law supernuons Friends
of Form lo Murker. 46 P :id at 14. Granted. interpreting the second
sentence as a clarif1cation that a commoclity lien can attach Lo the

agricu]lural producl or rhe prnseed:. from its :.ubscquenl sale
the
of the agricultural proclucl may
no1 effect any extensive change in lhe reacl1 or impact of the statute.
i:. consistent with the import of the
However, such ar,
1 anguagc of lhe sl;itule
Evans Grain also
to the
of State's
45-l 802.
lclaho
The
of State published the form lo be used by agncultura1
commodity dealers and
a lien. Thar
bOlh liveswck and milk
Evans
a rnong the kinds of property in whicti
Grain urges that the
ol Swte's
of such a form is
tanwmount to u fcumal
lhal the lkn
by the ,,lalULC
extends Lo livestock and milk. :m opinion which should be given
great weigill m
the statute.
The Cour: has considered this argument, but concludes tt is
1napplieabie in tt1is context. The Idaho
of Slate is not an
re leva!ll srntute. See Pear/ v. Bd
State Bd oflvfedicme, 44 P.3d 1162, 1168 (ldaho 2002)

the star.dard for applying agency deference). Therefore. even 1f the
inclusion of livestock and milk on the "official" form for
a lien does indeed represent the Secretary of State's
the statute, something the Court doubts, the agency's opinio1; is not
en lit led to deference.
NWT and Evans Grain are likely disappointed in the Court's
conclusion that the statute is not ambiguous. Howeve:,
assuming the meaning of the statute can not be determined
reference to the language in the law does not
mean these
lien cia1m:mts ;nust prevail. ln fact. even if the addition of the
secortd sentence to Idaho Code § 45- 1802 in l 989 somehow
rendered the statute ambiguous such that the Court should consider
the fu!I panoply of statutory construction tools. the
the statute by the Court would be no different.
to the other provisions
with agricultural
liens, the statutory framework as a whole reflects n
intent that commodity liens not extend to livestock.
Indeed. the very next provision of the Idaho Code
that:
The lien created by [§ 45- l 802) at1aches to 1he
subsequent
producf on the elate the
product is physically deli vcrcd lo the
or on the date any final payment is due, and
lo the
. producer or ... dealer . . whichever
occurs last.
added) So, loo, in the provision
lien created by the statures. the

The lien created by I§ 45. 1802] is preferred lo a lien or
security interest in Cavor of a creditor of the purchaser,
of whether the creditor's lien or security
111tcn;st al/aches to the agricuiwralproducr or proceeds
.m!e 1/ie
bdore nr after the
[§ 4)- 1802] attaches.
ldahc Code§ 45-1805
added) Thus. in no fewer than
rndicaled ils intent
three separnle imtance~. the Idaho
tlwt ;.1 c;1mnrndily lien cHtaclJ oniy Lo lhe agricultural product sold
clllC to the proceeds from subsequent sale or the product. but not to
any nlher •ypes of property .
.APPFT r ANT'C:. HRTFF
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product" :tlso
Tlw
use of I he term
liem; not attach Lo iivesLoek ur
evidences an intent that
any products thereof P.s mentioned above, "agricuiturnl product"
Is defined in ldaho Code § 45- I 801 ( 1) Thal defi nnion does not
include livestock or milk, o:· the
rrom the sale of such.
Interestingly, during :he s:ime session that the ldaJ10 Legislature
amenacd Idaho Code§ 45-1802, Jt also amendc~d rhe definition of
"agnculturai product" by
that a commodity lien would
continue despite the Caci that a raw product was processed in some
fash10r. for use as foed. Act ot' Apr. 3. J 989, ch. 265, § I, 1989
[claho Sess. Laws 644 (codil'iecl as amended at Idaho Code§ 45180!( I JJ The Legislature was obviously
Lile
reach of the !icon where Lhe agr·icultura! producl
incorporatecl or "processed m some fashion"
thl'.rcforc fair to infer L.~at had the Legislature also intendea tile iien
lo extend to the animals that consume an
or Lo
the products of those animills, it could have amended the statute:. to
provide rnch.
In ld::ihc, there is a strong
the amendment
of sunutes by implication. Idaho v.
990 P.2d 144. 148
(Idaho Ct. App. I 999) ("Statutory amendment by
is
disfavored and will not be inferred absent clear
The 1989 amendment to Idaho Code § 45-1802
scope of the lien as created in the first sentence of that statute, nor
is it clear that the 1989 legislature intended thc amendment to Idaho
Code § 45-1802 to aller Idaho Code §§ 45-l 803 and I 805. Were
the Court to read Idaho Code § 45- l 802 in the manner NWT and
Evans Grain suggest, an inconsistency in the statutes would result,
and questions would be created under Idaho Code §§ 45- 1803 and
1805 regarding when a lien on livest0ck would altach and as to the
of such a lien. NWT's and Evans Grain's interpretation
would require the Court to not only read into Idaho Code § 45-1 802
that the text does not provide. but also to assume the
1989 amendment modified the other two statutes as well.
reference to the legislative history of the statute in this
instance is frustrating and fruitless. The record presented by the
to the Court provides but a fleeting glimpse of the purpose
for the 1989 amendment. At the outset. the Court is skeptical that
the intent of the l 989 legislature in adopting an amendment to a
statute enacted years earlier is the only relevant legislmive history to
be considered here. As one court observed:
Ceneral ly. and perhaps wi thm!t cxc:eption,
intent in stalutory interpretation is helpful only if it is the
meaning attributed by the er.acting body. not the
of an amending body. If defcndunt's
argument had merit. then any leg1sla11ve session could
of laws predating their power lo
alter tl1e
by d::claring a legislative intent when
lilws that alter or
the meaning of
Jaw No
suprorts such a proposition and lo
woulc be an inv1taLion to all so1ts of legislative
Lehmann v.
Monl l

Nat'l /ns. Co., 979 F Supp. 1290. 1292 (D.

Th:~
from the 1989 session offers no
definitive insight mto the legislature's intent because the
commentmrm, offered inconsistent views on the amendment's goal.

111stance, Representative Newcomb'' inchcmed the arnendrnem
offl:reci to prciviclc tha: "a lien ha;, validity or rrn1y attach even
the leec\ feel tn an arnmal (ioe', no: acid value to the animal but JUSi
rnn1mairt' tL" Se11alc Agric
Comm. M11w1e.1, 1989
I''
al 4 (Idaho i CJ89) (statement of Rep Newcomb!
Newcomb ;:ilso rcferemxd an
s1mc
d1~;u1c: court case "that had refuted tlm concept" id BuL in a
cl1fferen1 com1mllec hcanng.
Newcomb indicatt:d he
:1d:e.vecl
lrn,, neen understood in lhe feed industry that wnen feed
v;;1s suld le \11] tO!~!;umer, Lhm thl' feed hen would attach lo the
11nirnal which was
fed
" House Agne A!frurs Comm.
M1n11ws. l 98lJ
at (ldano l 989 J (Wllemen\ of Rc:p
Newcomb)
However, one
belief as w an cnure
into how Idaho Code § 45~
views offer~ little
180'.1 should be
particularly when no state appellate
coun has construed the statute and the tcx! unambiguously permits
the agricultural produc sold and
a comrnochty lie,n ttJ allach to
the procetods from~ subsequent sale oi the agricultural prc1ducL
Ir. contrast. Senator
"pornted out the difficuity of
contained in the bill
understanding either the intent m the
:· Senate Agne Af(azr.s Comm. Minuie.L l 989 Leg .. J" Sess. al
4 (Statement of Sen Smyser). A
of the Idaho Bankers
AssociaLion "stated that his orgar.i1,at1or. could m~1ther support nor
oppose the legislation since they were unable to understand what the
intent of the bill is." id. (statement of Berne Jensen). Finally. an
attorney for tbe same associatron observed lhal the court case
referenced by Representative Newcomb
assumed a lien
on feed continued in cows and the language of the 1
amendment
mistakenly makes the same assumption, id. (statement of Pat
Col'.ins).
The only conclusion that can be safely drawn from the scant
i
history is tha! the Legislature, or at least those
individual lawmakers who participated in the passage of the
amendment rn the lien statute, were faced with amending
thal was
and they disagreed over whether Idaho Code
§ 45-1802.
it existed at that time, allowed a commodity Hen to
attach to livesto:::k, Like the senator quoted above. frorn a review of
this reccrd of
in the Legislature, the Court is uncertain
and perplexed about the intended purpose of the 1989 amendment
tc § 45- J 802 Unless tlle Court can confidently discem
inLent from the history of the
it should hesitate to
convert speculation into law.
In short even were the Coun to find ldaho Code § 45-1802
ambiguous. the application t>f the
tools of statutory
of the statute extending tht:
constructton does not
commodity lien to diliry cows thal consume feed or to tlle milk such
offers little
cows produce, The relevant
in1crpret1ve guidance. ancl instead show;, there was considerable
of the I 989 add!lion
disagreement and confusion about the
to Idaho Code§ 45-180'.2 at the time the second senlcnce was added.
On the other hand.
the statute
wntten preserves
corn;1stency by preventing the
of an mherwise
statutory scheme. ancl avoids the specter of
implication.
Conclusion
\\[1"

l~cwcomb was a member or tile House Agricultural Affairs
Committee and sponsor or the original Hou.1c bill which W<L' lmcr
arnc.nded by the Senate,

'' Mr.

'" Mr Smyser was a 1m:mbe1 of the Senate Agricul1urat Affairs
Commit lee.
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Thv ldalrn !A:gisiature presumably desired 111
agricultural commoditieto some modicum of prntecuon agarn;;! the
bt! yer' ,, hrok.e1: prumi.c.c tu pay for their nru~lucl" NWT':; anc! Evan'
Gram s interpretation ol Lhc lien st111ute,, wuuld extend that
protect1(11i tr\ th use· 111sU111cc.s where the buyer's animals consumr: the
pr,uducl,, sold. Their view ur the statute rnay or may not represent
p1il1cy. Extending the reach of the: lien, while it rrotew,
commodity dealer~. impam, tht.: right:. of o!bn cn:ditor:, who have
of the Court.
credil tu the farmer Ii i:c not the
however. w rlcterrrnnc wbicl1crechtors,11; rnntter oi policy. sbrn,ld
or should rrn< be
of the s!atutl'. is urnirnbiguou:, and the Coun i.c,
H as written. There i,, ;io support for an
anmitiow, extcmwn of the reach o' the lien created rn the
of thl' statute Because: !d~ho Codt: ~ 4.'» l HO'.' is ckar, <ind because
ol th:: su.irnte resmcts tht scope of tl1c lil!n to the
sold and ttJ the proceeds frorn <1 subsequent sale
of that product. rhe Coon declines the lemptauon to broaden il~
scope. The statute does noL extend an agricultural
lien
w livestock that consume feed covered by a commodity lien. tu the
from the sale of such livestock. or to the milk or other
products
by such JivesLock. lf the Idaho
intend;, to cast such a wide net. it must ciearly and cogently express
thal iment. 11
As a matter of law. the Bank is correct that NWT's and Evans
Grain· s statutory liens did not extend to Debtor's dairy cows. milk
or to the cash sale proceeds of those items, The Bank's motions for
and NWT's and Evans Grain's
summary judgment will be
motions for summary
will be denied. A separate order
will be entered.
DATED This 11 rn day of August. 2003.
JIM D. PAPPAS
CHJEF U.S. BANKRUPTCY JUDGE

11 B(;cansc of its ruling, lhc Cmn\ need !lol considct the m<•ny and complex
questions and implicatiorn, naturally flowing from a broad reading of the
statute. For example. in this instance, do the commodity sellers· liens
extend sokly 10 those animals thal actually consurnec the agncullllral
products sold to Debtor') If
who bears the burden nf provrng wlucb
animals dirt or did not. consume the feed? Do the hens aL10 extend to the
calves produced by tlw rnws'i Would the liens extend lo the compost
manufactured fron1 the manure prociucccl by the herd'! Al what poinl in
lime do the liens on the livestock attach and when <uc they extinguished or
1erminatccJ'I Thcsc ;uc .1usr a few of the difficult. hul vitally impo11JnL
policy issue~ genernteG by an expansive reading or the statutes. Giv~n lhc
realitie~ of bu.,inc,,s and the irnpo!lance of crcci11 to today's farmers,!( is
doubtful rhe couns can cffocuvely crc:ate wch rules of law on a case-by~
basis As with !lw Urnform Co1nrnerc:al
Ihc legislature is best
suited to give comprehensive. balanced consideration 10 the nee,ds and
expectations of all involved in agri-husint:ss wh(~l! designing such law:..
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